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Abstract
In this paper I revisit some basic issues concerning structural uncertainty and
catastrophic climate change. My target audience here is general economists, so this
paper could also be viewed as a somewhat less technical exposition supplementing
my previous work. I argue by example that it is implausible that low-probability
high-negative-impact events would not much in￿ uence an economic analysis of climate
change. I try to integrate the empirical examples and the theory together into a uni￿ed
package with a uni￿ed message.
1 Introduction
I believe that the most striking feature of the economics of climate change is that its extreme
downside is non-negligible. Deep structural uncertainty about the unknown unknowns
of what might go very wrong is coupled with essentially unlimited downside liability on
possible planetary damages. This is a recipe for producing fat tails in the extremes of
critical probability distributions. There is a battle being waged in the bad fat tail between
declining probabilities and increasing damages that is very di¢ cult to resolve because it is so
far outside the realm of ordinary experience. No one knows what exactly to do about this
disturbing situation. One thing is for sure: it does not make economic analysis of climate
change any easier.
￿(mweitzman@harvard.edu) Without blaming them for the remaining de￿ciencies in this paper, I am
extremely grateful for the constructive comments on an earlier version by James Annan, Daniel Cole, Stephen
DeCanio, Baruch Fischo⁄, Don Fullerton, John Harte, William Hogan, David Kelly, Michael Oppenheimer,
Robert Pindyck, Joseph Romm, and Richard Tol.
1In this paper I address some criticisms that have been leveled at previous work of mine
on fat tails and the so-called ￿dismal theorem.￿ At ￿rst I was inclined to debate some of
the critics and their criticisms more directly. But on second thought I found myself anxious
not to be drawn, by so doing, into being too defensive and having the main focus be on
technical details. Instead, I am more keen here to emphasize anew and in fresh language
the substantive concepts that, I think, may be more obscured than enlightened by a debate
centered on technicalities. I am far more committed to the simple basic ideas that underlie
this approach than I am to the particular mathematical form in which I have chosen to
express them. These core concepts could have been wrapped in a variety of alternative
mathematical shells ￿and the particular one that I chose previously is somewhat arbitrary.
The implications are roughly similar, irrespective of formalization. Some technical details are
unavoidable, but if I can make the underlying concepts acquire greater intuitive plausibility,
then I believe that this set of ideas will become more self-evident and more self-evidently
resistant to several of the criticisms that have been leveled against it.
In the following section 2, I present an intuitive-empirical argument that deep structural
uncertainty lies at the heart of climate change economics. Then, in section 3, I try to explain
some of the theory behind fat-tailed extreme events and discuss some possible implications
for the analysis of climate change. Section 4 concludes with a few summary remarks.
2 Deep Structural Uncertainty about Climate Extremes
By bene￿t-cost analysis (BCA) of climate change, I mean, in the widest sense, some overall
economic analysis centered on maximizing (or at least comparing) welfare. My notion of
BCA in the present context is so broad that it overlaps with an integrated assessment model
(IAM), and here I treat the two as essentially interchangeable. I begin by setting up a
straw man that I will label the ￿standard BCA of climate change.￿ Of course there is no
￿standard BCA of climate change,￿but I think this is an allowable simpli￿cation for purposes
of exposition here.
In this section I try to make a heuristic-empirical case for there being big structural
uncertainties in the economics of extreme climate change. I will argue on intuitive grounds
that the way in which this deep uncertainty is conceptualized and formalized should in￿ uence
the outcomes of any reasonable BCA of climate change. Further, I will argue that the
idea that uncertainty about extremes does not substantially in￿ uence outcomes from the
￿standard￿ BCA is implausible. My arguments in this section are not intended to be
airtight or rigorous. Rather, this is an intuitive presentation based on some very rough
stylized facts.
2We all know that computer-driven simulations are dependent upon the core assumptions
of the model inside the computer. My intuitive examples are frankly aimed at sowing a few
seeds of doubt that the ￿standard BCA of climate change￿is fairly representing structural
uncertainties about extreme events, and therefore its conclusions might be less robust than
is commonly acknowledged. I do not say that the ￿standard BCA of climate change￿is
wrong or even implausible, so much as that it is not robust with respect to the modeling of
catastrophic outcomes. I will try to make my case by citing ￿ve aspects of the climate science
and economics that do not seem to me to be adequately captured by the standard BCA. The
￿ve examples ￿which I call ￿Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5￿￿are limited to structural uncertainty
concerning the modeling of climate disasters. While other important aspects of structural
uncertainty might also be cited, I restrict my stylized facts to these ￿ve examples. In the
spirit of performing a kind of a ￿stress test￿on the standard BCA, I naturally concentrate
on things that might go wrong rather than things that might go right.
￿Exhibit 1￿ concerns the atmospheric level of greenhouse gases (GHGs) over the last
800,000 years. Ice core drilling in Antarctica began in the late 1970s and is still ongoing.
The record of carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4) trapped in tiny ice-core bubbles
currently spans 800,000 years.1 It is important to recognize that the numbers in this
unparalleled 800,000-year record of GHG levels are among the very best data that exist in
the science of paleoclimate. Almost all other data (including past temperatures) are inferred
indirectly from proxy variables, whereas these ice-core GHG data are directly observed.
The pre-industrial-revolution level of atmospheric CO2 (about two centuries ago) was
280 parts per million (ppm). The ice-core data show that CO2 varied gradually during
the last 800,000 years within a relatively narrow range roughly between 180 and 280 ppm
and has never been above 300 ppm. Currently, CO2 is at about 390 ppm, and climbing
steeply. Methane was never higher than 750 parts per billion (ppb) in 800,000 years, but
now this extremely potent GHG, which is 22 times more powerful than CO2 (per century),
is at 1,780 ppb. The sum total of all carbon-dioxide-equivalent (CO2e) GHGs is currently
at about 440 ppm. An even more startling contrast with the 800,000-year record is the rate
of change of GHGs: increases in CO2 were below (and typically well below) 25 ppm within
any past sub-period of 1,000 years, while now CO2 has risen by 25 ppm in just the last 10
years. Thus, anthropogenic activity has elevated atmospheric CO2 and CH4 to levels far
outside their natural range at a very rapid rate. The unprecedented scale and speed of
GHG increases brings us into uncharted territory and makes predictions of future climate
change very uncertain. Looking ahead a century or two, the levels of atmospheric GHGs
1See Dieter et al (2008), from which my numbers are taken (supplemented by data from the Keeling curve
for more recent times, available online at: ftp://ftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/ccg/co2/trends/co2_mm_mlo.txt).
3that may ultimately be attained (unless decisive measures are undertaken) have likely not
existed for tens of millions of years and the speed of this change may be unique on a time
scale of hundreds of millions of years.
Remarkably, the ￿standard BCA of climate change￿ takes little account of the mag-
nitude of the uncertainties involved in extrapolating future climate change so far beyond
past experience. Perhaps even more surprising, the gradual tightening of GHG emissions,
which emerges as optimal policy from the ￿standard￿BCA, typically attains stabilization
at levels of CO2 that approach 700 ppm. The ￿standard￿BCA thus recommends subject-
ing the Earth￿ s system to an unprecedented shock from geologically-instantaneously jolting
atmospheric stocks of GHGs up to two and a half times above their highest level over the
last 800,000 years ￿without mentioning the unprecedented nature of this unique planetary
experiment. This is my Exhibit 1.
￿Exhibit 2￿concerns the highly uncertain climate-change response to such kind of un-
precedented increases in GHGs. For speci￿city, I focus on the uncertainty of so called
￿equilibrium climate sensitivity.￿ This is a good example of a ￿known unknown.￿ How-
ever, it should be understood that under the rubric of climate sensitivity I am trying to
aggregate together an entire suite of uncertainties, including some non-negligible unknown
unknowns. So ￿equilibrium climate sensitivity￿is to be understood here as a prototype
example of uncertainty, or a metaphor, which is being used to illustrate much more generic
issues about highly uncertain climate change.
￿Equilibrium climate sensitivity￿(hereafter denoted S) is a key macro-indicator of the
eventual temperature response to GHG changes. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change in its IPCC-AR4 (2007) Executive Summary explains S this way: ￿The equilibrium
climate sensitivity is a measure of the climate system response to sustained radiative forcing.
It is not a projection but is de￿ned as the global average surface warming following a doubling
of carbon dioxide concentrations. It is likely to be in the range 2 to 4.5￿C with a best estimate
of 3￿C, and is very unlikely to be less than 1.5￿C. Values substantially higher than 4.5￿C
cannot be excluded, but agreement of models with observations is not as good for those
values.￿ The actual empirical reason why these upper tails are long and seem heavy with
probability dovetails with the theory: inductive knowledge is always useful, of course, but
simultaneously it is limited in what it can tell us about extreme events outside the range of
experience. In such situations one is forced back onto depending more than one might wish
upon the prior probability density function (PDF), which of necessity is largely subjective
and relatively di⁄use.
Any curve ￿tting exercise attempting to attribute probabilities to S￿4.5￿C, such as I am
doing here, is little more than conjectural speculation. My purpose is merely to show that
4critical results can depend on seemingly casual decisions about how to model tail probabili-
ties. To illustrate some striking implications for the analysis of climate change, I contrast
the use of two familiar PDFs to represent the upper-half tail of climate sensitivity above the
median: (1) the Pareto (or Power) distribution, subscripted P, which is the prototype exam-
ple of a fat upper tail; (2) the Normal distribution, subscripted N, which is the prototype of
a thin upper tail. There is some wiggle room in the de￿nition of what constitutes a fat-tailed
PDF or a thin-tailed PDF, but everyone agrees that probabilities declining exponentially or
faster (like the Normal) are thin tailed while probabilities declining polynomially or slower
(like the Pareto) are fat tailed. The IPCC de￿nes ￿likely￿as a probability above 66% but
below 90%. Here I choose 70% as de￿ning ￿likely￿and I calibrate all upper-tail probability
distributions so that P[S ￿3￿C]=.5, and P[S ￿4.5￿C]=.15.2
The following table gives some values for the two cumulative distributions.
b S = 3￿C 4.5￿C 6￿C 8￿C 10￿C 12￿C 15￿C 18￿C 20￿C
PP[S ￿ b S] .5 .15 .06 .027 .014 .008 .004 .003 .002
PN[S ￿ b S] .5 .15 .02 .003 7￿10￿7 3￿10￿10 6￿10￿17 2￿10￿25 4￿10￿32
Table 1: P[S ￿ b S] for a fat-tailed Pareto and thin-tailed Normal PDF.
Table 1 illustrates a tremendous di⁄erence in upper tail behavior. I think that the Pareto
PDF of climate sensitivity has a disturbingly large amount of probability in its upper tail.
There is no consensus on how to aggregate into one overarching PDF the results of many
di⁄erent climate sensitivity studies, and much controversy about how it might be done. For
what it is worth (perhaps very little), the median upper ￿ve percent probability level over
all 22 climate-sensitivity PDFs cited in IPCC-AR4 is 6.4￿C, which ￿ts with the Pareto PDF
above.3 Table 1 is giving probabilities for climate sensitivity, which corresponds to GHG
levels of 560 ppm of CO2e. Higher values of GHG concentrations give correspondingly higher
probabilities of large temperatures responses, in proportion to the log of GHG concentrations.
Table 2 below calculates some values of steady-state probabilities of increased temper-
atures T as a function of GHG concentrations G. The ￿rst row represents steady state
atmospheric stocks of greenhouse gas concentrations G (measured in ppm of CO2e). The
second row below it gives the median equilibrium temperature TM as a function of stabilized
2I lean more toward P[S ￿4.5￿C]￿17% than toward P[S ￿4.5￿C]￿5% because, for a time horizon of a
century and a half or so, it is plausibly the more inclusive ￿earth system sensitivity￿(which includes slow
feedbacks like albedo changes or methane releases) that matters more than the ￿fast-feedback equilibrium
sensitivity￿that IPCC-AR4 refers to.
3Details in Weitzman (2009).
5GHG stocks. The remaining rows give the probabilities of achieving at least the steady state
temperature increase represented by the entries in the table (6￿C and 10￿C) for both of the
chosen PDFs (Pareto=P=fat tail, Normal=N=thin tail).
G: 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 800 900 1000
TM 1.5￿ 2.1￿ 2.5￿ 2.9￿ 3.3￿ 3.6￿ 4.0￿ 4.3￿ 4.5￿ 5.1￿ 5.5￿
PP[T￿6] .9% 2% 4% 6% 8% 11% 15% 18% 22% 30% 39%
PN[T￿6] 10￿9 10￿5 .2% 1% 4% 9% 14% 20% 25% 35% 43%
PP[T￿10] .2% .45% .8% 1.3% 1.9% 2.5% 3.2% 4.0% 4.8% 6.6% 8.5%
PN[T￿10] 10￿30 10￿15 10￿10 10￿7 10￿5 10￿4 .1% .27% .64% 2.1% 4.6%
Table 2: Probabilities of exceeding T=6
￿C and T=10
￿C for given G = ppm of CO2e.
What is especially striking to me in Table 2 is the reactiveness of high-temperature
probabilities to the level of GHGs. The fat-tailed case seems especially worrisome. One
implication is that an optimal policy might be expected to keep down GHG levels and be
much less casual than the ￿standard￿BCA about letting CO2 levels approach 700 ppm. I
believe that Table 2 could be taken as indirect evidence that the main purpose of keeping
down GHG concentrations is e⁄ectively to buy insurance against catastrophic global warm-
ing. The above examples of the highly uncertain climate-change response to unprecedented
increases in GHGs constitutes my Exhibit 2.
￿Exhibit 3￿concerns possibly disastrous releases over the long run of bad-feedback com-
ponents of the carbon cycle that are currently omitted from most general circulation models.
The chief worry here is a signi￿cant supplementary component that conceptually should be
added on to the so-called ￿fast feedback￿climate sensitivity S that IPCC-AR4 works with.
This omitted component (which would be part of a more inclusive slow-feedback generaliza-
tion called ￿earth system sensitivity￿ ) includes the powerful self-ampli￿cation potential of
greenhouse warming due to heat-induced releases of sequestered carbon. One vivid example
is the huge volume of GHGs currently trapped in tundra permafrost and other boggy soils
(mostly as methane, a particularly potent GHG). A more remote (but even more vivid)
possibility, which in principle should also be included, is heat-induced releases of the even-
vaster o⁄shore deposits of CH4 trapped in the form of clathrates ￿which has a very small,
but decidedly non-zero, probability over the long run of having destabilized methane seep
into the atmosphere if water temperatures over the continental shelves warm just slightly.
6The amount of CH4 involved is huge, although it is not precisely known. Most estimates
place the carbon-equivalent content of methane hydrate deposits at about the same order
of magnitude as all fossil fuels combined. Over the long run, a CH4 outgassing-ampli￿er
process could potentially precipitate a disastrous strong-positive-feedback warming. Thus,
while it is a low-probability event, the possibility of a climate meltdown is not just the out-
come of a mathematical theory but has a real physical basis.4 Other examples of an actual
physical basis for catastrophic outcomes could be cited, but this one will do here. This is
my Exhibit 3.
￿Exhibit 4￿concerns what I view as a somewhat cavalier treatment in the literature of
damages or disutilities from extreme temperature changes. The ￿standard￿BCA damages
function reduces welfare-equivalent output by a quadratic-polynomial multiplier of the form
M(T) = ￿T 2=(1+ ￿T 2). I hasten to add that such calibrations were intended by the
authors to capture low-temperature damages and were never intended to be extrapolated
to very high temperature changes. For the sake of concreteness, I will use the damages
function in the latest version of the well known DICE model of William Nordhaus (2008).5
The results in terms of relative damages to output are given as Q(T) in Table 2.
T 2￿C 4￿C 6￿C 8￿C 10￿C 12￿C 15￿C 20￿C
Q(T) 1% 4% 8% 13% 19% 26% 35% 49%
Table 3: Quadratic damages function Q(T) = ￿T
2=(1 + ￿T
2) with ￿ = :002388.
I do not ￿nd such numbers convincing for higher temperatures. At an extraordinarily
high global average temperature change of T=20￿, the welfare-equivalent global consumption
loss in Table 3 is ￿only￿49%. The implied welfare-equivalent consumption losses of 35% for
T=15￿, and 19% for T=10￿ also seem to me to be far too low for doing a serious analysis of
the consequences of catastrophic losses from extreme climate change. Such a mild damages
function is preordained to make extreme climate change look empirically negligible, almost no
matter what else is assumed. Conversely, it turns out, fat-tailed PDFs are not by themselves
su¢ cient to make extreme climate change have empirical ￿bite￿without a damages function
that is immiserising for high temperature changes.
So what should the damages function be for very high temperatures? No one knows, of
4For more about methane clathrates, see Archer (2007) and the recent article by Shakova et al (2010).
5Nordhaus￿ s DICE model is perhaps the most famous integrated assessment model (IAM) in the economics
of climate change. The value ￿ = :002388 was used to generate his Figure 3-3 on page 51. Nordhaus
wisely does not try to project beyond T = 6￿, which is suitable for his purposes but unsatisfactory for mine.
7course. The predominant approach attempts to calculate what the world would be like for
a given small increase in global average temperatures. The economist tries to quantify such
things as damages due to changes in agricultural productivity, changes in climate, changes
in life styles, rising oceans, and so forth. This is a constructive approach that probably
represents the best we can do for small temperature changes. But I am uneasy when this
philosophy is extended to large changes in global average temperatures. Taking the most
extreme example I can imagine for making my point, suppose for the sake of argument that
average global temperatures were to increase by the extraordinary amount of 10￿C (with an
extraordinarily low probability, of course). It is true that people live very well in places where
the mean temperature is 10￿C higher than in Yakutsk, Siberia. However, I do not think that
these kinds of analogies can justify using such a comparative-geography approach for esti-
mating welfare-equivalent damages from an average planetary temperature change of 10￿C.
A ￿damages function￿is a reduced form representing global welfare losses from global aver-
age temperatures, which incorporates a staggering amount of regional and seasonal weather
heterogeneity. There is just too much structural uncertainty to put meaningful bounds on
the unprecedented almost-unimaginable changes to planetary welfare from average global
temperatures increasing by 10￿C. When there is such big uncertainty about catastrophic
damages, and when the damages function for high temperature changes is so conjectural,
the relevant degree of risk aversion, yet another important unknown here, will tend to play
a signi￿cant role in economic analysis of climate change. Other things being equal, high
degrees of risk aversion will make it more attractive to e⁄ectively take out insurance against
uncertain extreme damages by keeping GHG emissions low.
Of course I have no objective way to determine magnitudes of high-temperature damages,
but the last time that the world witnessed periods where global average temperatures were
very roughly ￿10￿C or so above the present was during the Eocene epoch ￿55-34 mya.
During these warming periods the earth was ice free while palm trees and alligators lived
near the North Pole. The Eocene was also the last epoch in which there were geologically
rapid increases in mean global temperatures of magnitude very roughly ￿5￿C or so above
an already warm background. Such hyperthermal events occurred over an average period of
very roughly ￿100K years or so, which is extremely gradual compared with current worst-
case anthropogenically-induced trajectories. It is unknown what exactly triggered these
temperature spikes, but they were accompanied by atmospheric carbon spikes. One leading
culprit is the strong-feedback release of large amounts of methane hydrates from clathrate
deposits, which is a non-negligible possibility over the next century or two if current emissions
trends are extrapolated. The major point here is that relatively rapid changes of global
average temperatures ￿5￿C above present values are extremely rare events extraordinarily
8far outside the scope of human experience. As for huge temperature increases like T ￿10￿,
the planetary e⁄ects are di¢ cult to imagine. To ￿nd a geologically instantaneous increase in
temperatures of magnitude T ￿10￿, one would perhaps have to go back hundreds of millions
of years. Others are free to calibrate any welfare-equivalent consumption loss they want
in the range above T ￿4￿, as anybody￿ s guess here is as good as mine. I don￿ t think that
a person needs accurate speci￿c stories about what might happen for T>10￿ to imagine
truly upending catastrophes undoing the planet and severely undermining the security of
human civilization ￿at the very minimum. A recent article calculated that global average
temperature increases of ￿11-12￿C would cause conditions under which more than half of
today￿ s human population would be living in places where there would be periods (at least
once a year) when death from heat stress would ensue after about six hours of exposure.6
As noted, the ￿standard￿BCA damages function reduces welfare-equivalent consump-
tion by a quadratic-polynomial multiplier. This essentially describes a single-attribute
utility function, or, equivalently, a multi-attribute utility function with strong substitutabil-
ity between the two attributes of consumption and temperature change. This would be an
appropriate formulation if the main impact of climate change is, say, to drive up the price
of food and increase the demand for air conditioning. This particular choice of functional
form allows the economy to substitute consumption for higher temperatures relatively easily,
since the limiting elasticity of substitution between consumption and higher temperatures
is one (due to the multiplicative-polynomial assumption). Very di⁄erent optimal policies
can be produced when other functional forms are used to express the disutility of disas-
trously high temperatures. To take an example, suppose that the disutility of temperature
change is additively separable instead of being multiplicatively separable (as in the ￿stan-
dard￿BCA). Suppose that welfare is instead the analogous additively-separable arithmetic
di⁄erence between a CRRA utility function of consumption and a quadratic loss function
of temperature changes. This amounts to postulating a genuine multi-attribute utility
function that describes a situation where the main impact of climate change is on things
that are not readily substitutable with material wealth, such as biodiversity and health. If
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion on the CRRA utility function of consumption is two,
it implies an elasticity of substitution between consumption and temperature change of one
half. Empirically, using this additive form ￿even without any uncertainty ￿prescribes
a signi￿cantly more stringent curtailment of GHG emissions than what emerges from the
analogous multiplicative form of the ￿standard￿BCA.7
6Sherwood and Huber (2010).
7With coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion two, the above additively-separable speci￿cation is mathemati-
cally equivalent to the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) speci￿cation of Sterner and Persson (2008)
with elasticity of substitution one half. In their pioneering study, Sterner and Persson showed empirically
9The above examples of non-robustness with respect to a damages function for high tem-
peratures, which we cannot know con￿dently, constitutes my Exhibit 4.
￿Exhibit 5￿concerns the notorious issue of how to discount the distant future. The e⁄ects
of global warming and climate change will be spread out over what might be called the ￿deep
future￿￿centuries and even millennia from now. The logic of compounding a constant
positive interest rate forces us to say that what one might conceptualize as monumental ￿
even earth-shaking ￿events like catastrophic climate change, do not much matter when they
occur in the deep future. Perhaps yet more disconcerting, when exponential discounting is
extended over very long time periods there is a truly extraordinary dependence of BCA on
the choice of a discount rate. Seemingly insigni￿cant di⁄erences in discount rates can make
an enormous di⁄erence in the present discounted value of distant-future payo⁄s. In many
long-run situations, almost any answer to a BCA question can be defended by one particular
choice or another of a constant discount rate. This is true in general, but it is an especially
acute problem when very-distant-future events like climate change (especially catastrophic
climate change) are being discounted.
There is a high degree of uncertainty about what should be taken as the appropriate
real rate of return on capital in the long run, accompanied by much controversy about its
implications for long-run discounting. There is no deep reason or principle that allows us
to extrapolate past rates of return on capital into the distant future. The industrial revo-
lution itself began some two centuries ago in Britain, and only slowly thereafter permeated
throughout the world. The seeming trendlessness of some past rates of return is a purely
empirical reduced-form observation, which is not based on any underlying theory that would
con￿dently allow projecting past numbers far into the future. There are a great many
fundamental non-extrapolatable factors, just one example of which is the unknown future
rate of technological progress. Even leaving aside the question of how to project future in-
terest rates, additional issues for climate change involve which interest rate to choose out
of a multitude of di⁄erent rates of return that exist in the real world.8 Furthermore, there
is a strong normative element having to do with what is the ￿right￿rate, which includes
an ethical dimension to discounting climate change across many future generations that is
di¢ cult to evaluate and incorporate into standard BCA. This normative issue is further
complicated when the event impacting future generations is a low-probability high-impact
catastrophic outcome.
The constant interest rates used for discounting in the ￿standard￿BCA would be viewed
￿by plugging it into Nordhaus￿ s deterministic DICE model ￿that their CES (or, equivalently, my additive)
welfare speci￿cation prescribes a signi￿cantly more aggressive policy response to global warming (with a
signi￿cantly higher carbon tax) than the analogous multiplicative speci￿cation of the ￿standard￿CBA.
8For more on this see Weitzman (2007).
10by many people as severely biasing BCA toward minimizing into near-nothingness the present
discounted value of distant future events, like climate change. This kind of exponential dis-
counting, perhaps more than anything else, makes scientists and the general public suspicious
of the economist￿ s ￿standard￿BCA of climate change, since it trivializes even truly enormous
distant-future impacts. To be honest, I think that among economists there are but few who
do not feel uneasy about evaluating distant-future climate-change impacts this way. One
line of research, in which I have been involved, shows that when the discount rate itself is
uncertain it implies that the ￿e⁄ective￿discount rate declines over time to its lowest possible
value.9 Empirically, this e⁄ect can be quite powerful.10 The driving force is a ￿fear factor￿
from risk aversion to permanent productivity shocks representing bad future states of the
world. Whatever its source, the unknown discount rate for BCA of climate change (and
the extraordinary sensitivity of policy to its choice) is yet another big structural uncertainty
in the economic analysis of climate change, especially for evaluating possible catastrophes.
This is my Exhibit 5.
These ￿ve ￿exhibits￿ could readily be extended to incorporate yet more examples of
structural uncertainty, but enough is enough. To summarize, the economics of climate
change consists of a very long chain of tenuous inferences fraught with big uncertainties in
every link: beginning with unknown base-case GHG emissions; then compounded by big
uncertainties about how available policies and policy levers will transfer into actual GHG
emissions; compounded by big uncertainties about how GHG ￿ ow emissions accumulate via
the carbon cycle into GHG stock concentrations; compounded by big uncertainties about
how and when GHG stock concentrations translate into global average temperature changes;
compounded by big uncertainties about how global average temperature changes decompose
into speci￿c changes in regional weather patterns; compounded by big uncertainties about
how adaptations to, and mitigations of, climate-change damages at a regional level are
translated into regional utility changes via an appropriate ￿damages function￿ ; compounded
by big uncertainties about how future regional utility changes are aggregated into a worldwide
utility function and what should be its overall degree of risk aversion; compounded by big
uncertainties about what discount rate should be used to convert everything into expected-
present-discounted values. The result of this lengthy cascading of big uncertainties is a
reduced form of truly extraordinary uncertainty about the aggregate welfare impacts of
catastrophic climate change, which mathematically is represented by a PDF that is spread
out and heavy with probability in the tails.
What I would wish a reader might take away from these ￿ve exhibits is the notion that
9See Weitzman (1998).
10See Weitzman (2010).
11the seeming immunity of the ￿standard￿BCA to such stylized facts seems peculiar. An
unprecedented and uncontrolled experiment is being performed by subjecting planet Earth
to the shock of a geologically-instantaneous injection of massive amounts of GHGs. Yet the
standard BCA seems almost impervious to the extraordinarily uncertain probabilities and
consequences of catastrophic climate change. A reader should feel intuitively that it goes
against the grain of common sense when, in view of the above ￿ve exhibits of structural un-
certainty, a climate-change BCA does not much depend upon how potential future disasters
are modeled and incorporated into the BCA. This uneasy feeling ￿of a system-wide failure
being plausible science ￿ction that is not adequately represented in the ￿standard BCA of
climate change￿￿is my opening argument. I turn next to the theory.
3 The Dismal Theorem, In￿nity, and BCA.
I begin this section by asking why is it relevant in the ￿rst place to have any supporting
theory at all if the ￿ve stylized-fact ￿exhibits￿from last section are convincing. Why aren￿ t
these stylized facts alone su¢ cient evidence that there is a problem with the ￿standard
BCA of climate change￿ ? My answer is that a combined theoretical plus empirical-intuitive
argument delivers a particularly powerful one-two punch at the treatment of structural un-
certainty in the standard BCA. In this respect I believe that the whole of my argument is
bigger than the sum of its two parts. The theoretical part reinforces the empirical part by
placing it within a formal mathematical framework. When the intuitive ￿exhibits￿are seen
as re￿ ecting some formalized theoretical structure, then it becomes less easy to brush them
aside as mere sniping at an established model. In this theoretical section of the paper, as
in the last empirical section, I emphasize the intuitive plausibility of the case I am trying to
make ￿here focusing on the underlying logic driving the theory.
The last section argued that it is only common sense that climate-change policy impli-
cations should depend on the treatment of low-probability extreme-impact outcomes. In
my article (Weitzman (2009)), the main question I attempted to address was whether such
intuitive sensitivity is re￿ ecting some deeper principle. My answer was that there is a basic
underlying theoretical principle that indeed points in this direction. The logic is simple
enough to be grasped intuitively without understanding the fancy math required to state
and prove a formal version. In this section I restate the theoretical arguments in what is
hopefully a more intuitive form.
Let welfare W stand for expected present discounted utility, whose theoretical upper
bound is B. Let D ￿ B ￿W be expected present discounted disutility. Here D stands for
what might be called the ￿diswelfare￿of climate change. Assume for the sake of argument
12that D is ￿essentially￿unbounded in the particular case of climate change because global lia-
bility is ￿essentially￿unlimited in a worst-case scenario. (More later on what happens when
D is, technically, bounded.) Because the integral over a nonnegative probability measure is
one, the PDF of lnD must decline to zero. In other words, extreme outcomes can happen,
but their likelihood diminishes to zero as a function of how extreme the outcome might be.
The idea that extreme outcomes cannot be eliminated altogether, but are hypothetically
possible with some positive probability, is not at all unique to climate change. Almost noth-
ing in our world has a probability of exactly zero or exactly one. What is worrisome is not
the fact that the upper tail of the PDF of lnD is long (re￿ ecting the fact that a meaningful
bound on diswelfare does not exist), but that it might be fat (with probability density).
The critical question is how fast does the probability of a catastrophe decline relative to the
welfare impact of the catastrophe.
Unless otherwise noted, my default meaning of the term ￿fat tail￿ (or ￿thin tail￿ )11
henceforth concerns the upper tail of the PDF of lnD, resulting from whatever combination
of probabilistic temperature changes, temperature-sensitive damages, utility functions, and
so forth, by which this comes about. This is the PDF that ultimately matters. Empirically,
it is not the fatness of the tail of temperature PDFs alone or the reactivity of the damages
function to high temperatures alone, or the degree of relative risk aversion alone, or any
other factor alone, that counts, but the interaction of all such factors in determining the
upper-tail fatness of the PDF of lnD. For example, other things being equal the PDF of
lnD has a fatter tail the more curved is the utility function or the greater is the probability
of low consumption, but neither condition alone implies a fat-tailed PDF of lnD. It may
seem arcane, but the upper-tail fatness of the reduced form PDF of lnD is the core issue in
the economics of catastrophic climate change. Of course it is extremely di¢ cult to know
the fatness of the upper tail of the PDF of lnD, which is precisely the main point of this
paper.
My article indicated a theoretical tendency for the PDF of lnD to have a fat tail. Concep-
tually, the underlying mechanism is not di¢ cult to grasp. Structural uncertainty essentially
means that the probabilities are unsure. A formal Bayesian translation might be that the
structural parameters of the relevant PDFs are themselves uncertain and have their own
11There is some wiggle room in the de￿nition of what constitutes a fat-tailed PDF or a thin-tailed PDF,
but everyone agrees that probabilities declining exponentially or faster (like the Normal) are thin tailed, while
probabilities declining polynomially or slower (like the Pareto) are fat tailed. The standard example of a
fat-tailed PDF is the power law (aka Pareto aka inverted polynomial) distribution, although, for example,
a Student-t or inverted-gamma PDF is also fat-tailed. A normal or a gamma are examples of thin-tailed
PDFs, as is any PDF having ￿nite supports, like a uniform distribution or a discrete-point ￿nite distribution.
Although both PDFs must approach a limit of zero, the ratio of a fat-tailed probability divided by a thin-
tailed probability goes to in￿nity in the limit.
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rior predictive￿PDF (in Bayesian jargon) of lnD tends to be fat tailed because the structural
parameters are unknown. Loosely speaking, the driving mechanism is that the operation
of taking ￿expectations of expectations￿or ￿probability distributions of probability distri-
butions￿tends to spread apart and fatten the tails of the compounded posterior-predictive
PDF. From past samples alone, it is inherently di¢ cult to learn enough about the prob-
abilities of extreme future events to thin down the bad tail of the PDF, because we don￿ t
have much data about analogous past extreme events. This mechanism provides at least
some kind of a generic story about why fat tails might be inherent in some situations.
The part of the distribution of possible future outcomes that we might now know (from
inductive information of a form as if conveyed by past data) concerns the relatively more
likely outcomes in the middle of the distribution. From past observations, plausible in-
terpolations or extrapolations, and the law of large numbers, there may be at least some
modicum of con￿dence in being able to construct a reasonable picture of the central regions
of the posterior-predictive PDF. As we move towards probabilities in the periphery of the
distribution, however, we are increasingly moving into the unknown territory of subjective
uncertainty, where our probability estimates of the probability distributions themselves be-
come increasingly di⁄use because the frequencies of rare events in the tails cannot be pinned
down by previous experiences. It is not possible to know enough now, from past data alone,
about the frequencies of future extreme tail events to make the outcomes of a BCA be in-
dependent from arti￿cially-imposed limitations on the extent of possibly ruinous disasters.
Climate-change economics generally, and the fatness of climate-change tails speci￿cally, are
prototypical examples of this principle, because we are trying to extrapolate inductive knowl-
edge far outside the range of limited past experience. To put a sharp point on this seemingly
abstract issue, the thin-tailed PDFs implicitly supporting gradualist conclusions have at least
some theoretical tendency to morph into fat-tailed PDFs when it is admitted that we are
unsure about the functional forms or structural parameters behind these implicitly assumed
thin-tailed PDFs ￿at least where high temperatures are concerned.
A fat upper tail of the PDF of lnD makes the willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid extreme
climate changes very large, indeed arbitrarily large if the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
is bounded above one. The article gave a formal argument within a speci￿c mathematical
structure, but this formal argument could have been embedded in alternative mathematical
structures ￿with the same basic message. The particular formal argument I gave in the
article came in the form of what I called a ￿dismal theorem￿(DT). In this particular for-
malization, the limiting expected stochastic discount factor is in￿nite (or, what I take to be
equivalent for purposes here, the limiting WTP to avoid fat-tailed disasters constitutes all
14of output). Of course, real-world WTPs are not 100% of output. Presumably the PDF in
the bad fat tail is thinned, or even truncated, perhaps from considerations akin to what lies
behind the value of a statistical life (VSL) ￿after all, we would not pay an in￿nite amount
to eliminate the fat upper tail of climate-change catastrophes. Alas, in whatever way the
bad fat tail is thinned or truncated, a climate-change BCA based upon it might remain
sensitive to the details of the thinning or truncation mechanism, because the disutility of
extreme climate change is ￿essentially￿unbounded. (There is ￿essentially￿unlimited liabil-
ity here because global stakeholders cannot short the planet as a hedge against catastrophic
climate change.) Later I discuss the meaning of this potential lack of robustness in climate-
change BCA and speculate on some actionable consequences it might imply regarding what
economists do and say.
Disagreements abound concerning how to interpret the in￿nity symbol that appears in the
formulation of DT. There is a natural tendency to sco⁄at economic models that yield in￿nite
outcomes. This reaction is presumably inspired by the idea that in￿nity is a ridiculous
result; therefore any model that has an in￿nity symbol in it is fundamentally misspeci￿ed,
and thus dismissable. Critics argue earnestly from their favorite examples that expected
disutility from climate change cannot actually be in￿nite, as if this were a telling indictment
of the entire fat-tailed methodology. I believe that, in the particular case of climate change,
the in￿nity is trying to tell us something important. The in￿nite limit in DT is a formal
mathematical way of saying that structural uncertainty in the form of fat tails is, at least in
theory, capable of swamping the outcome of any BCA that disregards this aspect.
The key issue here is not a mathematically illegitimate use of an in￿nite limit in DT.
In￿nity is a side-show that has unfortunately diverted attention from the main issue. It
is easy to modify utility functions, to add on VSL-like restrictions, to truncate probabil-
ity distributions arbitrarily, or to introduce ad hoc priors that cut o⁄ or otherwise severely
dampen low values of welfare-equivalent consumption. Introducing any of these (or many
other attenuating mechanisms) formally replaces the in￿nity symbol by some uncomfortably
large, but ￿nite, number. Unfortunately, removing the in￿nite limit in these or other ways
does not eliminate the underlying problem because it then comes back to haunt in the form
of a WTP to erase the structural uncertainty that is arbitrarily large. How large depends
sensitively upon obscure details about how the upper tail of the PDF of lnD has been
thinned or bounded. One can easily remove the in￿nity symbol from DT, but one cannot
so easily ￿remove￿the underlying substantive economic problem of extreme sensitivity to
fat tails and the resulting conundrum of deciding policy under such circumstances. The
overwhelming majority of real-world BCAs have thin upper tails in lnD from limited expo-
sure to system-wide catastrophic risk. However, a few very important real-world situations
15have e⁄ectively unlimited exposure due to structural uncertainty about their potentially
open-ended catastrophic reach. Climate change is unusual in potentially a⁄ecting the entire
worldwide portfolio of utility by threatening to drive all of planetary welfare to disastrously
low levels in the most extreme scenarios.
The ￿standard￿BCA approach appears to o⁄er a constructive ongoing scienti￿c-economic
research program for generating ever more precise outputs from ever more precise inputs. By
contrast, my main message can seem o⁄-putting because it can be painted as anti-scienti￿c
and anti-economic. Fat tails and the implied limitations that prevent BCA from reaching
robust conclusions are frustrating for economists. After all, we make a living from plugging
rough numbers into simple models and reaching speci￿c conclusions (more or less) on the
basis of these numbers. What are we supposed to advise policy makers and politicians
quantitatively about how much e⁄ort to spend on averting climate change if conclusions
from modeling fat-tailed uncertainties are not clear-cut? Practical men and women of
action have a low tolerance for vagueness and crave some kind of an answer, so they have
little place for even a whi⁄of fuzziness from two-handed economists. It is threatening for us
economists to admit that constructive ￿can do￿climate-change BCA may be up against some
limitations on the ability of quantitative analysis to give robust policy advice. But if this
is the way things are with the economics of climate change, then this is the way things are.
Non-robustness to subjective assumptions about catastrophic outcomes is an inconvenient
truth to be lived with rather than a fact to be denied or evaded just because it looks less
scienti￿cally objective in BCA. If this limits the ability to give ￿ne-grained answers to an
impatient public, then so be it.
In my opinion, economists need to emphasize more openly to the policy makers, the
politicians, and the public that, while formal climate-change BCA may be helpful, there is
a danger of possible overcon￿dence from undue reliance on subjective judgements about the
probabilities and welfare impacts of extreme events. What we can do constructively as
economists is to explain better the magnitudes of the unprecedented structural uncertainties
that are involved, explain why this feature limits what we can say, and present the best
BCAs and the most honest sensitivity analyses that we can under fat-tailed circumstances,
including many di⁄erent functional forms for extremes. At the end of the day, policy
makers must decide what to do on the basis of an admittedly sketchy economic analysis of
a gray area that just cannot be forced to render clear robust answers. The moral of the
dismal theorem is that, under extreme tail uncertainty, seemingly casual decisions about
functional forms, parameter values, and tail fatness can dominate BCA. Economists should
not pursue a narrow, super￿cially crisp, analysis by blowing away the low-probability high-
impact catastrophic scenarios as if this is a necessary price we must pay for the worthy goal
16of giving answers and advice to policy makers. An arti￿cial infatuation with crispness is
likely to make our analyses go seriously askew and undermine the credibility of what we have
to o⁄er by e⁄ectively marginalizing the very possibilities that make climate change so grave
in the ￿rst place.
The issue of how to deal with the deep structural uncertainties in climate change would be
completely di⁄erent and immensely simpler if systemic inertias, like the time required for the
system to naturally remove extra atmospheric CO2, were short, as is the case for many air-
borne pollutants like ozone, sulfur dioxide, and particulates. Then an important component
of an optimal strategy might be along the lines of ￿wait and see.￿ With strong reversibility,
an optimal climate-change policy should logically involve (among other elements) waiting to
learn how far out on the bad fat tail the planet will end up, followed by midcourse corrections
if we seem to be headed for a disaster. Alas, the problem of climate change seems bedeviled
almost everywhere by signi￿cant stock-accumulation inertias ￿in atmospheric CO2, in the
absorption of heat or CO2 by the oceans, and in many other relevant physical and biological
processes ￿that are slow to respond to attempts at reversal.
Take atmospheric carbon dioxide as one speci￿c example. Solomon et al (2009) calcu-
lated how concentrations of CO2 would be expected to fall o⁄over time if all anthropogenic
emissions were to cease immediately, following a future 2% annual growth rate of emissions
up to peak concentrations of 450, 550, 650, 750, 850 and 1,200 ppm. As the authors state:
￿The example of a sudden cessation of emissions provides an upper bound to how much
reversibility is possible, if, for example, unexpectedly damaging climate changes were to be
observed.￿ Results di⁄ered for di⁄erent trajectories and scenarios, but a crude rule of thumb
seemed to be that approximately 70% of the peak enhancement level over the preindustrial
level of 280 ppm persevered after 100 years of zero emissions, while approximately 40% of
the peak enhancement level over the preindustrial level of 280 ppm persevered after 1,000
years of zero emissions. This means, for example, that if atmospheric CO2 concentrations
were to peak at 800 ppm, followed forever thereafter by zero emissions, then atmospheric
concentrations would be ￿650 ppm after 100 years and ￿500 ppm after 1,000 years. These
numbers do not look to me like evidence supporting ￿wait and see￿policies. The capacity
of the oceans to take up atmospheric heat, and many, many other relevant mechanisms, tell
a similar story of long stock-accumulation irreversibilities relative to the time it takes to
extract and act upon meaningful signals of impending disasters.
Many researchers promote alternative speci￿cations that do not imply nearly such ex-
treme outcomes as do my speci￿cations. I do not claim that their formulations are wrong
or even implausible. I merely point out that they are not likely to be robust with respect
to assumptions about extreme catastrophic climate change and that they therefore fail an
17important ￿stress test.￿ Of course the reader should weigh the plausibility of the argu-
ments and the reasonableness of the various speci￿cations on their own merits. But it is
di¢ cult to form opinions about probabilities of climate-change extremes, or about disutility
functions for extreme temperatures, or about lots of other relevant things for deciding the
tail fatness of the PDF of lnD . Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a policy maker
believes the probability is 50% that my fat-tailed speci￿cation is correct and 50% that the
thin-tailed speci￿cation of someone else is correct. Then, other things being equal, rational
policy should lean more in the direction of my fat-tailed conclusions than in the direction
of someone else￿ s thin-tailed conclusions because of the highly asymmetric consequences of
fat tails vs. thin tails. In this sense, whether it is fair or unfair, the playing ￿eld is not
level between me and someone else. If one person advises you that a ￿re insurance policy
protecting your house against extreme losses is unnecessary because so few houses of your
kind burn to the ground, while another person advises you that a complete ￿re insurance
policy is necessary in your case, other things being equal should you ￿ ip a coin in deciding
what to do just because both advisers seem to be giving equally credible guidance?
Climate change is not the only possible catastrophic threat to humanity. In my article
I listed what I consider to be the half-dozen or so serious contenders with climate change for
potentially catastrophic impacts with non-negligible probabilities: biotechnology, nanotech-
nology, asteroids, strangelets, pandemics, runaway rogue computers, nuclear proliferation ￿
and went on to give a few tentative reasons why I think that climate change is especially
worrisome. It may well be that each of the other half-dozen or so serious candidates for fat-
tailed disasters deserves its own ballpark estimate of tail probabilities along with extremely
crude calculations of policy implications, which is about the best we can do with potential
catastrophes. Even if this were true, however, it would not lessen the need to reckon with
the strong potential implications of fat tails for BCA-like calculations in the particular case
of climate change.
4 Concluding Comments
Taking fat tails into account has implications for climate-change policy. Qualitatively, fat
tails favor more aggressive policies to lower GHGs than the ￿standard￿BCA. Alas, the
quantitative implications are less clear. As this paper has stressed, the natural consequence
of fat-tailed uncertainty should be to make economists less con￿dent about climate-change
BCA and to make them adopt a more modest tone that be￿ts less robust policy advice. My
own conclusion is that the sheer magnitude of the deep structural uncertainties concerning
catastrophic outcomes, and the way we express this in our models, is likely to in￿ uence
18plausible applications of BCA to the economics of climate change now and for some time to
come.
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